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Research questions
• SWFs investment activity has been intensive during the 
crisis
• They targeted especially banks and the financial sector
– What characterized the investment activity of SWFs?
– Which banks were targeted by SWFs?
– Do they show any differences compared to a peer group of 
banks?
SWFs market (1/3)
• A SWF is defined as
«a state-owned investment fund or entity that is commonly established from balance of 
payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, 
govermental transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from resource
exports» (SWF Institute)
• SWFs can be 
– stabilization funds
– savings funds
– reserve investment funds
– development funds
– contingent pension reserve funds (IMF, 2008).
SWFs market (2/3)
• SWFs are not a new phenomenon, but their size has been
increasing over the last 10-15 years
• The estimated size as at June 2015 was $7,207 billion; 
• The largest:
• Norway Government Pension Fund ($882 bln)
• ADIA ($773 bln)
• SAMA Foreign Holdings ($757 bln)
Source: Elaboration on SWF Institute data
SWFs market (3/3)
• The interest of SWFs in banking and financial sector has been
especially strong during the crisis. Recently has slightly diminished
– High investments especially in 2007 and 2008: recapitalization of home and 
Western financial institutions
– More recently: investmens mainly in foreign markets to gain exposure to high 
expected recovery rates with growth potential [Bortolotti et al., 2015]
Literature review (1/2)
• Literature is quite recent
• The research lines:
– Macroeconomic issues: financial stability, transparency and 
political concerns (Baker and Boatright, 2010; Das, 2009; Gieve, 
2009; Sun and Hesse, 2009)
– Microeconomic issues:
• Investments pattern and corporate governance behavior
• Effects on performance
Literature review (2/2)
Microeconomic issues
• Results are very heterogeneous
– Some specifically target distressed companies [Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2008; 
Kotter and Lel, 2011] 
– Often invest in banks and financial companies [Bortolotti et al., 2010; Fotak et 
al., 2008]
– SWF obtain representation in Boards on average in around 28% of the cases, but 
there is high variation [Bortolotti et al., 2010]
– Effects on performance can be positive in the short or long run [Bortolotti et al., 
2010; Kotter and  Lel, 2009, 2011; Dewenter et al., 2010; Chhaochharia and 
Laeven, 2008; Raymond, 2009; Knill et al., 2009], negative or unclear [Beck and 
Fidora, 2008]
– Financial targets have better performance than non-financial ones [Knill et al., 
2009]
– Investments are mainly determined by economic reasons [Avendano and Santiso, 
2009; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2008; Drezner, 2008; Reisen, 2008]
Sample selection
• Individuate SWFs investments in banks during the crisis
1. Identify the top 25 banks in European countries and US
2. Search for SWFs among shareholders
3. Cross check with other sources (SWF Institute, Monitor Group, 
FEEM, regulatory files)
– As additional check, also did the reverse (31)
– Exclude domestic investments
– Exclude holdings < 2%
– Exclude Norway’s Government Pension Fund-Global (passive 
investor)
• Ended up with 37 banks with at least one SWF among the 
shareholders (SWF banks)
Data – SWF investments (1/2)
• Most of the investments occurred between 2006 and 
2008 (acute phase of the financial crisis)
Data – SWF investments (2/2)
Data – SWF banks (1/2)
Bank
N. of SWFs
among
shareholders
Bank
N. of SWFs
among
shareholders
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 1 Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 1
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 1 B.L.C. Bank S.A.L 1
National Australia Bank Limited 1 RHB Capital Berhad 1
Arab Banking Corporation BSC 3 NIB Bank Ltd 1
Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A. 2 Nordea Bank 3
Corporate Commercial Bank AD 1 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 1
Agricultural Bank of China Limited 2 Credit Suisse Group AG 1
Bank of China Limited 2 UBS AG 1
China Construction Bank Corporation 2 Société Tunisienne de Banque 1
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 
(The) - ICBC 3
Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S 
1
Bank of Cyprus PLC Marfin 1 Barclays Plc 8
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) 
S.A.E. 1
HSBC Holdings Plc
4
Deutsche Bank AG 1 Lloyds Banking Group Plc 4
HDFC Bank Ltd 1 Standard Chartered Plc 6
ICICI Bank Limited 4 Bank of America Corporation 2
Bank Danamon Indonesia Tbk 1 Citigroup Inc 3
Bank Internasional Indonesia Tbk 1 Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 6
PT Bank Mayapada Internasional TBK 1 Morgan Stanley 1
UniCredit SpA 4
Data – SWF banks (2/2)
Performance
Variable
(%)
SWF banks Non-SWF 
banks
p-value
ROA Mean 0.88 1.12 0.052
Median 0.82 0.96 0.027
Cost/income Mean 62.91 56.39 0.000
Median 55.65 53.98 0.008
• Looking at the characteristics of SWF banks, we build a 
sample of matched banks in terms of country of 
incorporation, size, activity
• We use:
– ROA
– Cost/Income
Evidence on performance
ROA
SWF 
banks
Non-SWF 
banks
p-value
pre-crisis 0.865 0.965 0.400
acute crisis 0.82 1.02 0.047
crisis 0.74 0.92 0.242
Cost 
Income
SWF 
banks
Non-SWF 
banks
p-value
pre-crisis 56.34 57.06 0.590
acute crisis 54.87 54.31 0.589
crisis 55.82 51.85 0.014
Determinants of performance
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• Performance might be different according to:
– SWF presence (-)
– Bank characteristics: 
• size (+/-)
• credit risk (-)
• capitalization (-/+)
– Macroeconomic conditions:
• gdp growth (+)
• also year dummies, crisis period dummies
Roa
roa | mod1 mod2 mod3
SWF | -0.037 -0.04 -0.041
size | -0.055 25045 -0.053
npls | -0.118*** -0.110*** -0.118***
capital ratio | 0.011* 0.010* 0.011*
gdpgrow | 0.054*** 0.066*** 0.056***
acute | -0.233**
crisis | -0.064
constant | 1.740*** 1.653*** 1.782***
year dummies | N Y N
N | 476 476 476
r2 | 0.2099 0.2317 0.2154
legend: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Cost/Income
cost/income | mod1 mod2 mod3
SWF | 6.476* 6.437 6.458*
size | 0.555 0.902 1.006
npls | 1.035*** 1.296*** 1.279***
capital ratio | 0.284 0.384* 0.355*
gdpgrow | -0.863** -0.781 -1.113***
acute | 7.503**
crisis | -3.929
constant | 42.691*** 36.176*** 36.226***
year dummies | N Y N
N | 478 478 478
r2 | 0.0879 0.1251 0.1165
legend: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Robustness checks
• Other definitions of performance
– Roe 
– Total operating income/ta = (Net interest margin + non-interest margin)/total assets
– Tobin’s Q
• Other control variables
– Tier 1 capital ratio
– Deposits to funding ratio
• Eliminated 2004 and 2014 (low number of observations)
• Results remain similar 
Conclusions
• SWFs targeted low performing banks: support during the 
financial crisis
• Mainly acted as passive investors
• Limits
– Small sample (due to data availability and limited number of 
deals)
– Limited availability of accounting data for several banks
– Limited information on deals: e.g. unclear entrance date of the 
SWFs. How to measure performance before and after SWFs 
investment? If more than one SWF?
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